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- NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
- preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
- notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
- ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
- --------
- No. 91-719
- --------
- AL C. PARKE, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. RICKY
- HAROLD RALEY
- on writ of certiorari to the united states court
- of appeals for the sixth circuit
- [December 1, 1992]
-
- Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
- Kentucky's -Persistent felony offender sentencing-
- statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 532.080 (Michie 1990),
- provides mandatory minimum sentences for repeat felons.
- Under Kentucky law, a defendant charged as a persistent
- felony offender may challenge prior convictions that form
- the basis of the charge on the ground that they are
- invalid. Respondent, who was indicted under the statute,
- claimed that two convictions offered against him were
- invalid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969).
- The trial court, after a hearing, rejected this claim, and
- respondent was convicted and sentenced as a persistent
- felony offender. After exhausting his state remedies,
- respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
- United States District Court for the Western District of
- Kentucky. The District Court denied relief, but the Court
- of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered that the writ
- conditionally issue, concluding that the trial court proceed-
- ings were constitutionally infirm. As it comes to this
- Court, the question presented is whether Kentucky's
- procedure for determining a prior conviction's validity
- under Boykin violates the Due Process Clause of the
- Fourteenth Amendment because it does not require the
- government to carry the entire burden of proof by clear
- and convincing evidence when a transcript of the prior
- plea proceeding is unavailable.
-
- I
- In May 1986, the Commonwealth charged respondent
- Ricky Harold Raley with robbery and with being a persis-
- tent felony offender in the first degree. The latter
- charge was based on two burglaries to which respondent
- had pleaded guilty in November 1979 and October 1981.
- Respondent never appealed his convictions for those
- crimes. He nevertheless moved to suppress them in the
- persistent felony offender proceeding, arguing that they
- were invalid under Boykin because the records did not
- contain transcripts of the plea proceedings and hence did
- not affirmatively show that respondent's guilty pleas were
- knowing and voluntary.
- The trial court held a hearing according to procedures
- set forth in Commonwealth v. Gadd, 665 S. W. 2d 915
- (Ky. 1984), and Dunn v. Commonwealth, 703 S. W. 2d 874
- (Ky.), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 832 (1986). In Gadd, the
- Supreme Court of Kentucky observed that the persistent
- felony offender statute requires that the prosecution prove
- only the fact of a previous conviction beyond a reasonable
- doubt; the Commonwealth need not also show that the
- conviction was validly obtained. 665 S.W. 2d, at 917.
- But, citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967), the
- court also held that defendants must be able to attack a
- prior conviction's invalidity. Ibid. Dunn v. Common-
- wealth clarified the procedures to be followed. When a
- defendant challenges a previous conviction through a
- suppression motion, the Commonwealth must prove the
- existence of the judgment on which it intends to rely.
- Once this is done, a presumption of regularity attaches,
- and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evi-
- dence that his rights were infringed or some procedural
- irregularity occurred in the earlier proceeding. If the
- defendant refutes the presumption of regularity, the
- burden shifts back to the government affirmatively to
- show that the underlying judgment was entered in a
- manner that did, in fact, protect the defendant's rights.
- 703 S.W. 2d, at 876.
- After the prosecution filed certified copies of the prior
- judgments of conviction for burglary, both sides presented
- evidence about the earlier plea proceedings. Respondent
- testified that he had an eleventh grade education, that he
- read adequately, that he was not intoxicated or otherwise
- mentally impaired when he entered the challenged pleas,
- and that he was represented by counsel on both occasions.
- He remembered the trial judge in each case asking him
- whether his plea was voluntary, but he said he could not
- remember whether he was specifically told about the
- rights he waived by pleading guilty. The government's
- evidence showed that in the 1979 proceeding, respondent
- signed (though he later claimed not to have read) a -Plea
- of Guilty- form, which stated that he understood the
- charges against him, the maximum punishment he faced,
- his constitutional rights, and that a guilty plea waived
- those rights. The attorney who represented respondent
- in the first case verified his own signature on another
- part of the form indicating that he had fully explained
- respondent's rights to him. As to the 1981 plea, respon-
- dent acknowledged signing a form that specified the
- charges to which he agreed to plead guilty. He also
- admitted that the judge had at least advised him of his
- right to a jury trial.
- Based on this evidence, the trial court denied
- respondent's suppression motion. Respondent then entered
- a conditional guilty plea on the robbery and the persistent
- felony offender counts, reserving the right to appeal the
- suppression determination. The trial court sentenced him
- to 5 years for robbery, enhanced to 10 because of the
- persistent felony offender conviction.
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. It found the
- totality of circumstances surrounding the 1979 plea
- sufficient to support a finding that the plea was knowing
- and voluntary. It also upheld use of the 1981 conviction.
- The court explained that respondent's knowledge of his
- rights in November 1979 permitted an inference that he
- remained aware of them 23 months later. Respondent's
- testimony, moreover, indicated that his sophistication
- regarding his legal rights had increased substantially after
- his first conviction. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
- denied discretionary review.
- Respondent then filed a federal habeas petition, arguing
- that the Kentucky courts had erred in requiring him to
- adduce evidence, rather than requiring the Commonwealth
- affirmatively to prove the prior convictions' validity. The
- District Court denied the petition for essentially the same
- reasons given by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Raley
- v. Parke, Civil Action No. C89-0756-L(A) (WD Ky., Mar.
- 15, 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
- however, agreed with respondent, relying on its recent
- decision in Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F. 2d 1275 (1989), cert.
- denied, 494 U. S. 1061 (1990). 945 F. 2d 137 (1991).
- Simmons held that when no transcript of the prior guilty
- plea proceeding exists, the prosecution has the entire
- burden of establishing the plea's validity, and no presump-
- tion of regularity attaches to the final judgment. 877
- F. 2d, at 1277. It also held that when the prosecution
- seeks to demonstrate the regularity of the prior proceeding
- with extra-record evidence, that evidence must be -clear
- and convincing.- Ibid. Although Simmons was decided
- after respondent's persistent felony offender conviction
- became final, the Commonwealth did not argue that
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), barred its applica-
- tion to this case. Cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37,
- 40-41 (1990) (Teague not jurisdictional).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
- determination with respect to the 1979 plea but reversed
- with respect to the 1981 plea. It declined to infer that
- respondent remembered his rights from 1979, reasoning
- that such an inference would give rise to line-drawing
- problems and would discriminate improperly between
- accused recidivists and first offenders on the basis of prior
- court experience. The Court of Appeals observed that
- because the trial court hearing took place before Simmons
- was decided, the Commonwealth had not yet had an
- opportunity to try to meet the higher standard of proof
- that decision imposed. Thus, rather than issue the writ
- of habeas corpus outright, the Court of Appeals directed
- the District Court to grant the writ if Kentucky did not
- hold a new hearing on the validity of the 1981 conviction
- in compliance with Simmons within 90 days. We granted
- certiorari. 503 U. S. ___ (1992).
-
- II
- A
- Statutes that punish recidivists more severely than first
- offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates
- back to colonial times. See, e.g., I The Acts and Resolves,
- Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
- 52 (Boston 1869) (1692 statute providing progressive
- punishments for robbery and burglary); 3 Laws of Virginia
- 276-278 (W. Henning ed. 1823) (1705 recidivism statute
- dealing with hog stealing); see also Graham v. West
- Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 623 (1912). Such laws currently
- are in effect in all 50 States, see U. S. Department of
- Justice, Statutes Requiring the Use of Criminal History
- Record Information 17-41 (June 1991) (NJC-129846), and
- several have been enacted by the Federal Government, as
- well, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. 924(e) (Armed Career Crimi-
- nal Act); 21 U. S. C. 842(c)(2)(b), 843(c), 844(a) (provi-
- sions of the Controlled Substances Act); see also United
- States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 4A1.1
- (Nov. 1992) (prior criminal conduct enhances criminal
- history for purpose of determining sentencing range).
- States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating
- habitual criminals. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263,
- 284 (1980). We have said before that a charge under a
- recidivism statute does not state a separate offense, but
- goes to punishment only. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S.
- 448, 452 (1962); Graham, supra, at 623-624; McDonald
- v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 313 (1901). And we have
- repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes -against contentions
- that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with
- double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual
- punishment, due process, equal protection, and privileges
- and immunities.- Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560
- (1967) (citing Oyler, supra; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728
- (1948); Graham, supra; McDonald, supra; Moore v. Mis-
- souri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895)). But see Solem v. Helm, 463
- U. S. 277 (1983) (life sentence without parole imposed
- under recidivism statute violated Eighth Amendment when
- current conviction was for passing a bad check and prior
- offenses were similarly minor).
- The States' freedom to define the types of convictions
- that may be used for sentence enhancement is not unlim-
- ited. In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967), we held
- that uncounseled convictions cannot be used -against a
- person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for
- another offense.- Id., at 115. This Court has neverthe-
- less also expressed a willingness to uphold, under the Due
- Process Clause, a variety of state procedures for imple-
- menting otherwise valid recidivism statutes. See Spencer,
- supra (due process allows government to introduce proof
- of past convictions before jury has rendered guilt determi-
- nation for current offense); Oyler, supra (due process does
- not require advance notice that trial for substantive
- offense will be followed by habitual-criminal accusation).
- As Justice Harlan observed 25 years ago in Spencer, the
- Court is not -a rule-making organ for the promulgation
- of state rules of criminal procedure.- 385 U. S., at 564.
- -Tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with
- [recidivism] is especially appropriate- given the high rate
- of recidivism and the diversity of approaches that States
- have developed for addressing it. Id., at 566. We think
- this reasoning remains persuasive today; studies suggest
- that as many as two-thirds of those arrested have prior
- criminal records, often from other jurisdictions. See U. S.
- Department of Justice, supra, at 1; see also Spencer,
- supra, at 566, n. 9. The narrow question we face is
- whether due process permits Kentucky to employ its
- particular burden-of-proof scheme when allowing recidi-
- vism defendants to attack previous convictions as invalid
- under Boykin. In our view, Kentucky's burden-shifting
- rule easily passes constitutional muster.
-
- B
- As an initial matter, we decline to reach the broad
- argument advanced by petitioner and the Solicitor General
- that Kentucky's procedure is a fortiori constitutional
- because, with narrow exceptions not applicable here, due
- process does not require state courts to permit challenges
- to guilty pleas used for enhancement purposes at all.
- Petitioner did not make this argument below or in its
- petition for certiorari. We ordinarily do not reach issues
- not raised in the petition for certiorari, see Yee v. City of
- Escondido, 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992), and it is unneces-
- sary for us to determine whether States must allow
- recidivism defendants to challenge prior guilty pleas
- because Kentucky does allow such challenges. We turn,
- then, to the question before us.
- It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both
- knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., Boykin, 395 U. S., at
- 242; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969).
- -The standard was and remains whether the plea repre-
- sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alter-
- native courses of action open to the defendant.- North
- Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 31 (1970). That is so
- because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three consti-
- tutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to
- confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-
- incrimination. Boykin, 395 U. S., at 243.
- In Boykin the Court found reversible error when a trial
- judge accepted a defendant's guilty plea without creating
- a record affirmatively showing that the plea was knowing
- and voluntary. Id., at 242. The Sixth Circuit thought
- rejection of Kentucky's burden-shifting scheme compelled
- by Boykin's statement that the waiver of rights resulting
- from a guilty plea cannot be -presume[d] . . . from a
- silent record.- Id., at 243. Kentucky favors the prosecu-
- tion with only an initial presumption upon proof of the
- existence of a prior judgment; but because a defendant
- may be unable to offer rebuttal evidence, the Sixth Circuit
- reasoned that Kentucky's procedure improperly permits
- the Commonwealth to carry its burden of persuasion upon
- a -bare record of a conviction.- Simmons, 877 F. 2d, at
- 1278.
- We see no tension between the Kentucky scheme and
- Boykin. Boykin involved direct review of a conviction
- allegedly based upon an uninformed guilty plea. Respon-
- dent, however, never appealed his earlier convictions.
- They became final years ago, and he now seeks to revisit
- the question of their validity in a separate recidivism
- proceeding. To import Boykin's presumption of invalidity
- into this very different context would, in our view, improp-
- erly ignore another presumption deeply rooted in our
- jurisprudence: the -presumption of regularity- that
- attaches to final judgments, even when the question is
- waiver of constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
- U. S. 458, 464, 468 (1938). Although we are perhaps
- most familiar with this principle in habeas corpus actions,
- see, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 887 (1983);
- Johnson, supra, it has long been applied equally to other
- forms of collateral attack, see, e.g., Voorhees v. Jackson,
- 10 Pet. 449, 472 (1836) (observing, in a collateral chal-
- lenge to a court-ordered sale of property in an ejectment
- action, that -[t]here is no principle of law better settled,
- than that every act of a court of competent jurisdiction
- shall be presumed to have been rightly done, till the
- contrary appears-). Respondent, by definition, collaterally
- attacked his previous convictions; he sought to deprive
- them of their normal force and effect in a proceeding that
- had an independent purpose other than to overturn the
- prior judgments. See Black's Law Dictionary 261 (6th ed.
- 1990); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 58,
- 65 (1980) (challenge to uncounseled prior conviction used
- as predicate for subsequent conviction characterized as
- -collateral-).
- There is no good reason to suspend the presumption of
- regularity here. This is not a case in which an extant
- transcript is suspiciously -silent- on the question whether
- the defendant waived constitutional rights. Evidently, no
- transcripts or other records of the earlier plea colloquies
- exist at all. Transcripts of guilty plea proceedings are
- normally made in Kentucky only if a direct appeal is
- taken or upon the trial judge's specific direction, Tr. of
- Oral Arg. 13-14, and the stenographer's notes and any
- tapes made of the proceedings normally are not preserved
- more than five years, id., at 16-17. The circumstance of
- a missing or nonexistent record is, we suspect, not atypi-
- cal, particularly when the prior conviction is several years
- old. But Boykin colloquies have been required for nearly
- a quarter-century. On collateral review, we think it defies
- logic to presume from the mere unavailability of a tran-
- script (assuming no allegation that the unavailability is
- due to governmental misconduct) that the defendant was
- not advised of his rights. In this situation, Boykin does
- not prohibit a state court from presuming, at least ini-
- tially, that a final judgment of conviction offered for
- purposes of sentence enhancement was validly obtained.
- Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967), does not necessi-
- tate a different result. There the Court held that a prior
- conviction could not be used for sentence enhancement
- because the record of the earlier proceeding did not show
- that the defendant had waived his right to counsel. Id.,
- at 114-115. Respondent suggests that because Burgett
- involved a state recidivism proceeding, it stands for the
- proposition that every previous conviction used to enhance
- punishment is -presumptively void- if waiver of a claimed
- constitutional right does not appear from the face of the
- record. Brief for Respondent 14-15. We do not read the
- decision so broadly. At the time the prior conviction at
- issue in Burgett was entered, state criminal defendants'
- federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been
- recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the
- defendant had not waived a right he did not possess. As
- we have already explained, the same cannot be said about
- a record that, by virtue of its unavailability on collateral
- review, fails to show compliance with the well-established
- Boykin requirements.
- Respondent argues that imposing even a burden of
- production on him is fundamentally unfair because -a
- constitutionally protected right is in question.- Brief for
- Respondent 15. By this he apparently refers to the Fifth
- and Sixth Amendment rights that a defendant waives by
- pleading guilty. Our precedents make clear, however, that
- even when a collateral attack on a final conviction rests
- on constitutional grounds, the presumption of regularity
- that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate to
- assign a proof burden to the defendant. See, e.g., John-
- son, supra, at 468-469.
- Respondent also contends that Kentucky's rule is unfair
- because it may be difficult to prove the invalidity of a
- conviction entered many years ago, perhaps in another
- jurisdiction, when records are unavailable and witnesses
- inaccessible. We have little doubt that serious practical
- difficulties will confront any party assigned an evidentiary
- burden in such circumstances. See Loper v. Beto, 405
- U. S. 473, 500-501 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
- -The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a
- State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis
- that it may produce results more favorable to the ac-
- cused.- Medina v. California, 505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992).
- When a defendant challenges the validity of a previous
- guilty plea, the government will not invariably, or perhaps
- even usually, have superior access to evidence. Indeed,
- when the plea was entered in another jurisdiction, the
- defendant may be the only witness who was actually
- present at the earlier proceeding. If raising a Boykin
- claim and pointing to a missing record suffices to place
- the entire burden of proof on the government, the prosecu-
- tion will not infrequently be forced to expend considerable
- effort and expense attempting to reconstruct records from
- far-flung States where procedures are unfamiliar and
- memories unreliable. To the extent that the government
- fails to carry its burden due to the staleness or unavail-
- ability of evidence, of course, its legitimate interest in
- differentially punishing repeat offenders is compromised.
- In light of the relative positions of the defendant and the
- prosecution in recidivism proceedings, we cannot say that
- it is fundamentally unfair to place at least a burden of
- production on the defendant.
- Respondent cites no historical tradition or contemporary
- practice indicating that Kentucky's scheme violates due
- process. See Medina, supra, at ___. For much of our
- history, it appears that state courts altogether prohibited
- defendants in recidivism proceedings from challenging
- prior convictions as erroneous, as opposed to void for lack
- of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kelly v. People, 115 Ill. 583, 588,
- 4 N. E. 644, 645-646 (1886); accord, State v. Webb, 36
- N. D. 235, 243, 162 N. W. 358, 361 (1917). In recent
- years state courts have permitted various challenges to
- prior convictions and have allocated proof burdens differ-
- ently. Some, like the Sixth Circuit, evidently place the
- full burden on the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Elling,
- 11 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 15, 463 N. E. 2d 668, 670 (Com. Pl.
- 1983) (challenge to allegedly uncounseled conviction); State
- v. Hennings, 100 Wash. 2d 379, 382, 670 P. 2d 256, 257
- (1983) (challenge to guilty plea). Others assign the entire
- burden to the defendant once the government has estab-
- lished the fact of conviction. See, e.g., People v. Harris,
- 61 N. Y. 2d 9, 15, 459 N. E. 2d 170, 172 (1983) (guilty
- plea); see also D. C. Code Ann. 23-111(c)(2) (1989);
- N. C. Gen. Stat. 15A-980(c) (1988). Several, like Ken-
- tucky, take a middle position that requires the defendant
- to produce evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction
- is proved but that shifts the burden back to the prosecu-
- tion once the defendant satisfies his burden of production.
- See, e.g., Watkins v. People, 655 P. 2d 834, 837 (Colo.
- 1982) (guilty plea); State v. O'Neil, 91 N. M. 727, 729, 580
- P. 2d 495, 497 (Ct. App. 1978) (uncounseled conviction);
- State v. Triptow, 770 P. 2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (same).
- This range of contemporary state practice certainly does
- not suggest that allocating some burden to the defendant
- is fundamentally unfair.
- Interpretations of analogous federal laws by the Courts
- of Appeals point even more strongly away from
- respondent's position. Under the Armed Career Criminal
- Act, 18 U. S. C. 924(e), Courts of Appeals have placed
- on the defendant the entire burden of proving the invalidi-
- ty of a prior conviction based on a guilty plea. See, e.g.,
- United States v. Gallman, 907 F. 2d 639, 643-645 (CA7
- 1990), cert. denied, 499 U. S. ___ (1991); accord, United
- States v. Paleo, 967 F. 2d 7, 13 (CA1 1992); United States
- v. Day, 949 F. 2d 973, 982-983 (CA8 1991); United States
- v. Ruo, 943 F. 2d 1274, 1276 (CA11 1991). Courts of
- Appeals have also allocated the full burden of proof to
- defendants claiming that an invalid guilty plea renders a
- prior conviction unavailable for purposes of calculating
- criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines. See,
- e.g., United States v. Boyer, 931 F. 2d 1201, 1204-1205
- (CA7 1991), cert. denied, 502 U. S. ___ (1991). And the
- text of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
- Control Act of 1970 itself clearly provides that a defendant
- raising a constitutional challenge to a prior conviction
- used for sentence enhancement bears the burden of proof.
- See 21 U. S. C. 851(c)(2).
- In sum, neither our precedents nor historical or contem-
- porary practice compel the conclusion that Kentucky's
- burden-shifting rule violates due process, and we cannot
- say that the rule is fundamentally unfair in its operation.
- Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause permits
- a State to impose a burden of production on a recidivism
- defendant who challenges the validity of a prior conviction
- under Boykin.
- C
- Petitioner also challenges the Sixth Circuit's holding
- that the prosecution's extra-record evidence must be clear
- and convincing. In petitioner's view, the preponderance
- of the evidence standard applicable to constitutional claims
- raised on federal habeas, see, e.g., Johnson, 304 U. S., at
- 468-469, is appropriate. The Sixth Circuit based its
- conclusion to the contrary on Boykin, observing that an
- -extraordinary standard of persuasion- is justified -in view
- of misgivings inherent in `collateral proceedings that seek
- to probe murky memories.'- Simmons, 877 F. 2d, at 1277
- (quoting Boykin, 395 U. S., at 244); see also Roddy v.
- Black, 516 F. 2d 1380, 1384 (CA6), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
- 917 (1975). Respondent, in support of the Sixth Circuit's
- heightened standard, reiterates his arguments regarding
- the importance of the constitutional rights at stake and
- the government's position relative to the defendant's.
- Our analysis of this question parallels our discussion of
- the proper allocation of proof burdens. Boykin did not
- address the question of measure of proof, and even if it
- had, it would not necessarily follow that the same stan-
- dard should apply in recidivism proceedings. We find
- respondent's arguments no more persuasive here than
- they were in the allocation context. Given the difficulties
- of proof for both sides, it is not obvious to us that, once
- a State assigns the government the burden of persuasion,
- requiring anything less than clear and convincing extrinsic
- evidence is fundamentally unfair. Again, we are pointed
- to no historical tradition setting the standard of proof at
- this particular level. And contemporary practice is far
- from uniform; state courts that impose the ultimate
- burden on the government appear to demand proof
- ranging from preponderance, see Triptow, supra, at 149;
- Watkins, supra, at 837, to beyond a reasonable doubt, see
- Hennings, supra, at 382, 670 P. 2d, at 257. We are
- therefore unprepared to say that when the government
- carries the ultimate burden of persuasion and no tran-
- script of the prior proceeding exists, the Due Process
- Clause requires the Commonwealth to prove the validity
- of the conviction by clear and convincing extra-record
- evidence.
- III
- Respondent no longer challenges the validity of his 1979
- plea. Thus, the final issue before us is whether the
- Kentucky courts properly concluded that respondent's 1981
- guilty plea was valid. For the proper standard of review,
- petitioner cites Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422
- (1983), a case quite similar to this one. In Lonberger, the
- state defendant challenged a prior conviction used to
- obtain a death sentence on the ground that the conviction
- was based on a guilty plea invalid under Boykin. We
- held that although -the governing standard as to whether
- a plea of guilty is voluntary for purposes of the Federal
- Constitution is a question of federal law,- 459 U. S., at
- 431, questions of historical fact, including inferences
- properly drawn from such facts, are in this context
- entitled to the presumption of correctness accorded state
- court factual findings under 28 U. S. C. 2254(d),
- Lonberger, supra, at 431-432; cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474
- U. S. 104, 113, 115, 117 (1985) (holding that the question
- whether a confession is voluntary is subject to indepen-
- dent federal determination, expressly distinguishing
- Lonberger). We said that the federal habeas courts in
- Lonberger were bound to respect the contents of the record
- of the prior plea proceeding, the state trial court's findings
- that the defendant was -an intelligent individual, well
- experienced in the criminal processes and well represented
- at all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable
- counsel,- the similar conclusions of the state appellate
- court, and -inferences fairly deducible from these facts.-
- Lonberger, supra, at 435 (internal quotation marks omit-
- ted); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 545-547
- (1981) (deference owed to findings of both state trial and
- appellate courts).
- We note that petitioner's theory of the case, which we
- have declined to consider, suggests a different standard.
- If Kentucky's procedure is indeed not constitutionally man-
- dated, the Kentucky courts' determination that respondent
- understood his rights when he entered his plea would
- seem to be reviewable at most for sufficiency of the
- evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979).
- There is no need to choose between the two standards of
- review in this case, however, because we are convinced
- that the Kentucky courts' factual determinations are
- -fairly supported by the record- within the meaning of 28
- U. S. C. 2254(d)(8).
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals, reviewing the trial
- court's decision not to suppress the 1981 conviction,
- observed that respondent had an eleventh grade education,
- could read adequately, was represented by counsel in the
- 1981 proceedings, and was in no way mentally impaired
- when he entered his plea. The court noted that respon-
- dent had signed a form specifying the charges to which
- he agreed to plead guilty. And it found that he had been
- fully advised of his rights in 1979. Respondent does not
- now dispute those determinations. The Kentucky Court
- of Appeals inferred that respondent remained aware in
- 1981 of the rights of which he was advised in 1979.
- Supporting that inference was the court's determination,
- based on respondent's testimony at the trial court hearing,
- that his -knowledge and sophistication regarding his rights
- under our judicial system increased substantially after his
- first conviction.- App. to Pet. for Cert. A32. Respondent
- knew, for example, the difference between first- and
- second-degree persistent felony offender charges, and he
- knew the sentencing and parole requirements for both
- offenses. -[H]e indicated that the evidence against him
- and his lack of a strong defense had persuaded him to
- accept the Commonwealth's offered plea bargain in return
- for a recommendation that he be given a minimum
- sentence. In fact, he voluntarily and knowingly chose not
- to risk the uncertainties of a jury trial.- Id., at 32-33.
- We have previously treated evidence of a defendant's
- prior experience with the criminal justice system as
- relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived
- constitutional rights, see, e.g., Lonberger, supra, at 437;
- Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 730 (1948), and we think
- the Kentucky Court of Appeals fairly inferred that respon-
- dent understood the full consequences of his 1981 plea.
- That, combined with respondent's admission that he
- understood the charges against him and his self-serving
- testimony that he simply could not remember whether the
- trial judge advised him of other rights, satisfied every
- court that has considered the issue that the government
- carried its burden of persuasion under the Kentucky
- framework. We cannot say that this was error.
- The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
- Circuit is accordingly
- Reversed.
-